PDGS - Documents

RESTORING AND STRENGTHENING CIVILIAN CONTROL: BEST PRACTICES IN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES

Carolina G. Hernandez, Ph.D
Maria Cecilia T. Ubarra

ISDS

31 December 1999

Table of Contents

Executive Summary

Part One: Civil-Military Relations in the Philippines

State of Civil-Military Relations

- Pre-Marcos Administration 1940 - 1964

- The Rise of Communist Insurgency in the Philippines1965 - 1985

Civil-Military Relations

- Marcos Administration 1965-1985

- Problems at the Military Front

Collapse of the Marcos Authoritarian Regime

Part Two: Challenges to Civil-Military Relations in the Transition Period

Rebuilding and Strengthening Civilian Control Institutions and Mechanisms

- Instituting Freedom of the Press

- Judicial Reform

- Civil Society Empowerment

- New Constitution

- Post-Edsa Elections

Redefining the Military Role: Institutional Separation of the Police from the AFP

Coups d'Etat: Challenging Political Leadership

Pervasive Graft and Corruption

- Graft and Corruption in the Military

Part Three: Trekking the Path to Peace and Reconciliation

Davide Fact-Finding Commission

Confidence-Building Measures and its Outcome

Concluding Comments

Part Four: Institutional Programs of the AFP on Military Reform, Reconciliation and Nation-Building

Profile 1: Redefining the Core Values of the AFP

Profile 2: The AFP and its Agenda on Human Rights

Profile 3: Co-ed Military Education and Recruitment at the Philippine Military Academy

Profile 4: Civil-Military Operations with- Special Focus on unlad-bayan

Part Five: Best Practices in Civil-Military Relations in the Philippines

Summary of Best Practices

Conclusion

Bibliography

Executive Summary

The paper examines the programs, policies and initiatives that had been implemented during the critical transition period from 1986 to 1998 that sought to strengthen civilian control and to effect democratic consolidation. These programs include those formulated and implemented by the national government, the top brass of the AFP, and civilian groups.

Reform Measures

Ravaged by coups d'etat and insurgency, the Aquino administration focused on professionalizing the military through institutional change, redefinition of the military's role, enhanced training, and value formation. The paper discusses the investigation of the failed coup of December 1989, the administration's initiative to separate the police and constabulary from the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and place the former under the control of the Department of Interior and Local Government. This policy resulted in a clearer delineation of roles and responsibilities, separation of command, control, and supervisory mechanisms, and separation of budget allocations between the military and the police.

Moreover, the paper describes the process by which the military together with civilian organizations redefined the core values of the military. This process resulted in the formulation of the Military Values Education (MILVED) program, the attendance in human rights courses and clearance from the Philippine Commission on Human Rights as a requirement for military promotions and the establishment of the Office of Ethical Standards and Public Accountability. In addition, a legislative initiative requiring all government personnel including those in the military to file a Statement of Assets and Liabilities as an anti-corruption instrument in government is also discussed.

When the Ramos administration succeeded the Aquino administration, most of the country's democratic institutions have been re-established, reformed or reinvented. The main challenge to the Ramos administration was how to sustain the existence of these institutions in the face armed challenges to the government, of the gargantuan debt problem, the negative growth of the economy, and continuous calamities that ravaged the country. He pursued critically important macro-economic restructuring measures to open up various sectors in the economy, destroy monopolies, and restore investor confidence.

The Ramos administration also tapped the military as a partner in progress. The paper discusses the role of the Philippine Air Force and Navy in Relief and Disaster Coordination programs and environmental activities, and the implications of the policy of removing the gender bias in military science through the admission of women into the officer corps.

Best Practices

Numerous initiatives are being implemented to improve civil-military relations in the Philippines. Between civilian organizations and the military, the latter is more proactive in formulating and implementing confidence-building measures (CBMs).

Confidence-building measures can be classified into two broad categories: informal and formal. Civilian organizations lean more on informal CBMS that are related to their particular advocacy.

Meanwhile, the AFP's initiatives can be classified into three categories each having its own target audience. Under the first category are activities that aim to increase public awareness of the AFP's goals and activities. The target audience is the public-at-large.

The second category is focused on providing direct services to communities. Particular attention is given to communities that were once strongholds of communist insurgents.

The third category is composed of activities that enhance inter-agency cooperation and coordination. The target audience are other government agencies or institutions.

Profile of Best Practices

Profile 1: Redefining the Core Values of the AFP
Profile 2: The AFP and its Agenda on Human Rights
Profile 3: Co-ed military education and recruitment at the Philippine Military Academy
Profile 4: Civil-military operations with special focus on the Unlad-Bayan Program

Part One: Civil-Military Relations in the Philippines

In a country trying to achieve democratic consolidation, a careful study of its institutions, which have deliberately breached the principle of civilian supremacy in the past, must be conscientiously attended to. In the case of the Philippines, the military's previous implementations martial rule and other subsequent attempts to usurp civilian political authority is well documented and can serve as a useful case study in democratizing civil-military relations.

In light of the role played by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in the last thirty years of Philippine political history, important considerations must be raised regarding civil-military relations in the Philippines especially as the country strives to strengthen its claim to democratic ideals and institutions. For example, how is the AFP adjusting to the re-democratization of Philippine institutions? What roles does the military seek to play in the building of a democratic and globally-competitive society? How has the government and civil society responded to the legitimate concerns of the military?

This paper examines the programs, policies and initiatives which were implemented during the critical transition years from 1986 to 1998 in order to strengthen civilian control and to achieve democratic consolidation. These programs include those formulated by the national government, the top brass of the AFP, and civilian groups. In addition, the paper documents the best practices in restoring confidence between government and civil society on the one hand, and the military, on the other.

I. State of Civil-Military Relations: 1940 - 1964

Pre-Marcos Administration

From its inception in 1936 to the 1940s the task of the AFP was confined to defending the country from external threats, providing for internal defense, and promoting peace and order. US military presence in the bases in the Philippines as well as the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Philippines tended to de-emphasize the task of external defense in the mission of the AFP. The rise of the communist insurgency placed the responsibility for internal defense at the top of AFP's mission. Certain sociopolitical factors led to the military's assumption of socioeconomic functions beginning in the early 1950s. These duties expanded into other roles, especially political ones by the time of the imposition of martial law in 1972.

During the whole pre-Marcos era, the AFP was subordinated to the civilian political authority because the Commander-in-Chief of the military was also the elected President of the Republic. Control powers over the military by the executive branch were shared with the legislature through power over the budget, appointments and promotion of ranking military officers, and investigation of cases including those involving military and defense matters.

Political parties, an independent judiciary, a free and vibrant press, and an active civil society helped ensure civilian oversight, together with the emphasis on civilian supremacy over the military in civilian and military educational institutions. Socialization in this ethos among military officers was also attained through military schooling in US military academies and colleges, in addition to other training schools.

The Rise of Communist Insurgency in the Philippines

The main factor that catalyzed the role expansion of the military is the rise of the Hukbalahap (Huks), an agrarian-based and Soviet-influenced insurgency, which threatened to destabilize the government and hinder development in the countryside. Having lost faith in the government and the electoral process, the Huks escalated their armed struggle under the slogan of "bullets not ballots".

II. Civil-Military Relations: 1965 - 1985

Marcos Administration

After President Ferdinand Marcos assumed office on December 31, 1965, he made the AFP an integral component of his economic development program.

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Problems at the Military Front

During martial law, Marcos coddled his favorites in the military. Promotions continued to be his sole prerogative and loyalty became the primary criterion. Well-connected officers were able to place their people in important and lucrative positions. Consequently, some officers were retired at a fairly young age and at fairly lower ranks. A number of officers were promoted over more senior and qualified candidates. These promotions include that of an officer who was personally loyal to Marcos but widely perceived as inferior in professional qualifications to the other candidate, General Fidel V. Ramos, to the position of Chief of Staff of the AFP. A breakdown in the merit system and demoralization among the officer corps became inevitable. This situation generated momentum for subsequent military plots against the government.

This situation was further aggravated by government mismanagement of the economy and the rise of "crony" capitalism. Graft and corruption exacerbated the poverty problem, especially in the rural areas. Unable to achieve genuine development in the countryside, NPA recruitment intensified and its cause gained popular support.

III. The Collapse of the Marcos Authoritarian Regime

The events that brought the collapse of Marcos' authoritarian regime came in swift succession although triggered by the assassination in August 1983 of Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr., Marcos' staunchest critic and the most popular of the opposition figures. Aquino's assassination marked the turning point for those disenchanted with the Marcos authoritarian regime. The upper and middle classes joined the underclass in the opposition to the regime.

In 1986, the snap presidential elections called by Marcos to generate a fresh mandate and shore up his regime ended in the collapse of the regime and the ouster of Marcos. Aquino's widow, Corazon or Cory as she is popularly known, led the opposition in contesting the elections which Marcos tried to steal through fraud and violence. While millions of Filipinos stood their ground, a military conspiracy to oust Marcos and arrest the opposition was uncovered by the government. In order to save themselves from certain arrest and detention, the military rebels led by Col. Gregorio (Gringo) Honasan and the Defense Secretary, with General Ramos (then the Vice Chief of Staff) as a late and rather hesitant recruit, defected from the government and declared their support for Cory.

Millions of Filipinos poured into the streets to protest the officially declared results of the presidential snap elections that declared Marcos the winner and to lend support to the breakaway military faction. The people power revolt on EDSA in February 1986 is said to have inspired the ouster of authoritarian governments and the advent of democratization in the rest of the world, including in Poland, South Korea, Taiwan, and Pakistan in the late 1980s. With the ouster of Marcos, Corazon Aquino was installed as the new president.

Part Two: Challenges to Civil-Military Relations in the Transition Period

As the newly installed president, Corazon Aquino was fully aware of the "colossal mandate" that she inherited.

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I. Rebuilding and Strengthening Civilian Control Institutions and Mechanisms

Instituting Freedom of the Press

The first civil rights that were restored by the Aquino administration included press freedom in particular, and the right to free expression. During 14 years of dictatorial rule, Filipinos were deprived of their right to free expression. The military raided newspapers critical of the Marcos regime. Broadcast stations were also seized and controlled by the Office of the President. Furthermore, journalists were jailed, forced to resign, or killed under mysterious circumstances. Private homes were not safe from intrusion either. Marcos used hundreds of his loyalists to spy on homes and monitor conversations of people critical of his administration.

Aquino changed all of this by instituting openness and transparency in government information, lifting the constraints on media including censorship, and pursuing the privatization of media facilities.

The main challenge to the administration was how to re-tool and streamline the bloated government media structure whose activities were anomalous to if not anathema to a democracy. The government addressed this problem by abolishing the principal media offices run by government, namely the Office of Media Affairs and the National Media Production Center.

Judicial Reform

Aquino also sought to revive the judiciary's integrity and independence. She called for the resignation of Marcos appointees from the Supreme Court, the Intermediate Appellate Courts, and the local Courts of First Instance. She appointed Justice Claudio Teehankee, the most senior justice and who by tradition should have been Chief Justice under Marcos but was bypassed, and who was also well-respected by his peers, to become the new chief justice and to lead the reorganization and transformation of the judiciary.

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Civil Society Empowerment

Social organizations engaged in development work constitute most of civil society in the Philippines. Tracing their roots from volunteer groups working alongside American welfare agencies during the American colonial period, the civil society movement in the Philippines was forced to go underground during the martial law period. On the eve of the debates on whether to participate or not in the February 1986 snap elections, non-government organizations (NGOs) and peoples organizations (POs), except those identified with the CPP/NPA, threw their support behind Aquino's candidacy. These organizations played a crucial role in organizing and mobilizing the popular forces before and during the popular revolt following the elections.

As a consequence of civil society's role in bringing down the authoritarian regime, various socially progressive laws were enacted in Congress to establish provisions in the Constitution affirming the role of civil society in nation building. The enactment of the Local Government Code, the Urban Development and Housing Act, and the Women in Development and Nation Building Act are just some examples of laws that empowered these organizations.

Moreover, Aquino formed the KABISIG movement, a partnership between non-government organizations and the government, to address the issue of poverty and empowerment of communities through joint efforts of government and NGOs. KABISIG is an acronym for kapit-bisig which is a Filipino term for " arms linked together". KABISIG was more than just a program; Aquino utilized the movement to bring about national unity and solidarity and in particular, to provide a venue for confidence building between the military and civilian groups in and out of government.

Through KABISIG projects, soldiers and civil society groups, which used to face each other across the barricades set up by the military to secure the Marcos government, came to know each other and work together in nation building efforts. Official development assistance (ODA) funds - which increased dramatically due to the international community's goodwill to Aquino - were channeled to the NGO sector to fund projects that complemented the government's priorities. One particular project is the school building program that was funded by the government but implemented by the NGOs.

New Constitution

Taking advantage of the power earned by the people's mandate, Aquino further set out to put the Philippine house in order by laying the groundwork for the drafting of a new constitution. She appointed a Constitutional Commission of 50 distinguished citizens to draft a new constitution that would be ratified through a national plebiscite. On February 2, 1987, an overwhelming 90% of the voting population participated in the nationwide plebiscite, 76.30% of whom voted for the ratification of the Constitution.

Post-Edsa Elections

With a widely supported constitution accompanied by sweeping judicial reforms, electing the Congress was the final step in institutionalizing the structures of formal democratic rule. The elections of the country's 8th Congress took place on May 11, 1987. Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Chair Hilario G. Davide,Jr. regarded the congressional elections as "an unqualified success and a triumph of the democratic system ingrained in the 1987 Constitution".

Table 1: Voter Turn-out by Date and Type of Electoral Exercise From 1988 to 1998

ELECTORAL EXERCISES			No. of Precincts	Total Registered Voters	No. of Voters who actually Voted	Voter Turn-out
	DATE	TYPE	No. of Precincts	Total Registered Voters	No. of Voters who actually Voted	Voter Turn-out
1	Feb. 7, 1986	Presidential and Vice-Presidential Special Elections	85,688	26,278,744	20,716,075	78.83%
2	May 11, 1987	Congressional Elections	101,410	26,569,539	22,739,995	85.59%
3	Jan. 18, 1988	Local Elections set-up the local government	103,464	27,625,062	21,797,365	78.90%
4	Mar. 28, 1989	Barangay Polls established the village government	104,415	27,938,065	18,855,929	67.49%
5	May 11, 1992	Synchronized National and Local Elections; elected the president/vice-president for the first time under the 1987 Charter. It also elected the 9^th Congress and local government officials	169,935	32,141,079	24,254,954	75.46%
6	Dec. 4, 1992	Sangguniang Kabataan (Youth Council) elections	39,762	4,180,479	3,227,329	77.20%
7	May 9, 1994	Barangay Elections	-	35,004,502	22,668,696	64.76%
8	May 8, 1995	Congressional polls elected the 10^th Congress	169,863	36,415,154	25,736,505	70.68%
9	May 12, 1997	Barangay Elections	101,685	37,736,792	24,073,966	63.79%
10	May 11, 1998	Synchronized National and Local Elections; elected the president,vice-president,Congress, and local government officials	173,077	33,873,665	29,285,775	86.46%
Source: Commission on Elections, Records and Statistics Division

II. Redefining the Military Role

In addition to the rebuilding of civilian political institutions, the Aquino administration looked into the reorganization of the widely polarized and unstable military institution. During the drafting of the Constitution, there was a very strong public outcry to redefine the military's role in a way that would prevent the repetition of events leading to martial law. In addition, civil society organizations called for a clear delineation of military and police functions. In the years following the ratification of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, these civil society organizations, with members representing the academe, human rights organizations, church-based organizations and peoples organizations, served as partners in reforming the military and as watch-dogs against military adventurism.

Civil society organizations became the military's ally in terms of instituting value reformation within the different service units. These groups participated in consultation workshops which drafted new programs and procedures in order to increase the military's accountability. At the same time, human rights groups and church-based organizations ensured that the military follows the international conventions on rules of engagement and human rights accords. Section 4 of this report discusses this partnership in more detail.

Constitutional Provisions on Military Reform

A logical starting point for this reformation is the 1987 Philippine Constitution which establishes clear boundaries with regard to civilian supremacy over the military. Section 3 Article II of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies states that:

Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the national territory.

Another provision contained in Article VII, Section 18 ensures that a repetition of the martial law years will not be so easily implemented. This provision makes it hard for the President (Commander-in-Chief) to declare martial law indefinitely. Within forty-eight (48) hours of the declaration, the President is required to submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. In turn, the Congress can revoke such a declaration that subsequently, cannot be overturned by the President. Furthermore, the Constitution rules that:

". . .a state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilian where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ (of habeas corpus)".

With the exception of voting, the military's participation is limited by constitutional provisions which prohibit the military from running for public office, campaigning for a particular candidate, permitting themselves to be used by politicians to obtain votes, or undertaking any activity for any other political purposes.

In order to further define the role of the military, another constitutional provision called for the separation of the police, a civilian agency, from the military's administrative supervision and control. This provision provided a better balance of forces between the military and the civilian sectors of government and promoted efficiency in instilling peace and order.

Institutional Separation of the Police from the AFP

During the 15 plus years since its formation, elements of the Integrated National Police (INP) became "militarized", especially after they were formally merged with the Philippine Constabulary (PC) in 1976.14 The PC at that time was one of the major service commands of the AFP. Prior to the merger, local chief executives in the cities, municipalities, and provinces exercised control and supervision over the police forces. Under his control as Commander-In-Chief, Marcos sought to centralize all armed units of the government by integrating the police forces and putting them under the control of the chief of the PC.

" The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by a national police commission. The authority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law."

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III. Coups d'Etat: Challenging Political Leadership

Ironically, the same phenomenon that catapulted Aquino to her position also sought to topple her. With the usual three-month honeymoon period just barely over, Aquino faced one of the toughest tests of her leadership in July 1986, when a group of armed military men and supporters of the ousted Marcos occupied the Manila Hotel and declared it the temporary seat of government. Some 490 military personnel and 5,000 Marcos loyalists witnessed Marcos' vice-presidential running mate, Arturo Tolentino, take his "oath of office" as acting president on behalf of Marcos who had been exiled in Hawaii.

The Rebolusyonaryong Alyansang Makabayan or RAM (the break away faction in February 1986) had about 500 active members. A majority of them were trained in the country's only military academy whose alumni had inordinate high self-esteem. They belonged to the Classes of 1971 to 1973, and 1981 to 1988. These individuals belong to the young elite faction in the AFP that had long grown disenchanted with what they claimed as patronage and unprofessionalism in the military particularly during the Marcos period.¹⁸
The Alyansang Tapat sa Sambayanan (ALTAS) was a group formed to represent members of the military and civilian rebels loyal to Marcos. Leading ALTAS members were, at one time or another, linked with the Presidential Security Command of Marcos and/or the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) under Gen. Fabian Ver.¹⁹
The Young Officers Union (YOU), which was formally launched on August 8, 1988 by some AFP/INP lieutenants and captains who met at Camp Aguinaldo to explore common problem areas and grievances besetting the defense and law enforcement agencies in relation to the overall national situation. The Fact-Finding Commission concluded that YOU could be a splinter group from RAM, and was "an attempt to distance young generation of officers from their elders, many of whom have been tainted by close association with powerful politicians in the previous regime".²⁰

IV. Pervasive Graft and Corruption

In some of the most critical junctures during her leadership, Aquino's legitimacy and hold on power remained steadfast due to popular perception of her sincerity and integrity. In fact, her moral ascendancy was a major deciding factor for the opposition to field her as its sole challenger to Ferdinand Marcos in the 1986 snap presidential elections. Aquino was well aware of the people's goodwill and used this as a linchpin to re-establish democratic institutions and reinvigorate democratic processes in the country.

In spite of Aquino's unquestioned moral ascendancy and leadership by example, graft and corruption remained unabated. In 1988, the Philippines ranked third after China and Indonesia in graft and corruption according to a comparative country risk survey conducted by the Political and Economic Risk Consultancy, Ltd.

Graft and Corruption in the Military

The military was not exempt from graft and corruption. As an institution, graft and corruption had long taken roots in the military. Corruption was nurtured by the long years of political patronage that slowly eroded the moral foundation of the organization.

Graft and corruption in the military exists in different degrees. This corruption may be as negligible as siphoning petroleum from military vehicles for private consumption to illegal logging or gun-smuggling activities. Military officers involved in the coups d'etat testified to its prevalence.

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Part Three: Trekking the Path to Peace and Reconciliation

"A society becomes great not by the victories of its factions over each other but by its reconciliations."24

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I. Davide Fact-Finding Commission

One of the most sincere indications of Aquino's commitment to peace and reconciliation was her creation of the Presidential Fact-Finding Commission that was later reorganized as an independent commission by a law enacted in Congress.

On December 6, 1989, the sixth day of the failed December coup, Aquino issued Administrative Order no. 146 creating a Presidential Fact-Finding Commission.

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Table 2: Recommendation of the Fact-Finding Commission that Investigated the Failed Coup of December 1989

Damage Control and Short-Term Prescriptions	Agenda for the Remaining twenty-one Months of the Aquino Administration	Long-Term
Justice and Rehabilitation program	On the part of the Executive Department, a review of key policies and programs in the light results, an acceptance of shortcomings where these exist, and a performance review of appointive officials.	Love of country as the Highest value.
Strengthening of security measures for those under detention, especially where there may be sympathetic guards.	On the part of the President, a categorical declaration of her position with respect to the issue of re-election.	Social Justice
Intensification of efforts to capture key renegade soldiers with a special unit of trusted officers directly responsible to the CSAFP.	On the part of the President, the immediate convening of the National Security Council and an initiative to invite all political parties to enter into a compact, to which peoples organization and citizen groups would also subscribe, to defend and preserve our democracy, abiure the use of force and violence to effect change, commit to the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections in 1992, and arrive at solutions to our national problems through an honest and open debate of issues and programs;	Citizen Army
Reinvestigation of the "God Save the Queen" plot and prosecution of all those implicated in it.	On the part of the political opposition, a positive response to call for a united front against unconstitutional means to change the government and for upholding democratic processes	Decentralization.
A review of the subsequent actions of those involved in the Manila Hotel incident, both military and civilian, who pledged never to engage in similar adventurism again, if spared from prosecution.	On the part of the Legislative Department and the President, the establishment of a special full-time commission to implement a post-insurgency program for the military that will modernize, professionalize, and bring it within the mainstream of national life	The Constitution.
An intensive follow-up investigation by government police agencies and the Justice Department of civilians implicated in the December 1989 attempt	On the part of the legislative Department, the immediate enactment of laws to ensure the democratization of the electoral process and the validity and public acceptance of its results, with particular reference to the critical 1992 synchronized election.	Choosing Democracy
Speedy action on appeals regarding decisions of AFP courts-martial.	The supremacy of the civilian authority over the military should be established by the appointment, as soon as practicable, of civilian with the capability, integrity, and leadership to head the Department of National Defense, the National Security Council (NSC), and the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA). The NICA should have its own intelligence capability that can complement as well as validate military intelligence information.
The early passage of a comprehensive law on the establishment of the National Police.	The President and the Commission on Appointment must work out a system by which recommendations for promotions can be categorized in practice to avoid the exploitation of the confirmation process for political purpose.
The immediate implementation of a comprehensive program to provide timely rescue and medical assistance to troops wounded in combat.	The budget of the Judiciary and the Department of Justice must be increased in order to upgrade the physical facilities recording, investigative and prosecution, and staffing of the system.
A review by the military of its decision to disband the Scout Ranger Regiment.	The business sector, as the engine of growth for the economy, is the key sector, in addition to the government, in avoiding a severe economic crisis that could invite military adventurism. The business sector should stake its resources for democracy as the only political system under which it can survive and thrive, and thereby help others overcome their poverty.
An immediate audit of the value formation program of the military and, with the help of civilian experts, the formulation of an intensive program.	The non-governmental organizations and civil society groups are intermediating institutions which can help unify a factionalized society. By mobilizing communities and resources to improve the lives of the poor, they help the people at the grassroots create a stake in democracy.
The immediate removal or reassignment of officers who are less than 100 percent loyal to civilians from sensitive positions in the military hierarchy, i.e., intelligence, operations, logistics, and training functions.	The church occupies a unique position in Philippine Society, acting as an arbiter on moral issues even in the realm of politics, i.e., the condemnation of the election fraud committed by the Marcos administration in February 1986, although inhibited by the constitutional mandate of separation of church and state, the boundaries of which may shift from time to time.
The immediate disbandment of GCFI and all other organizations which are unauthorized by the military	The resolution of the dilemma faced by media in crisis reporting lies more in the media itself rather than government.
Enforcing the practice of a systematic selection process for the new Chief of Staff that generates the least controversy about the choice.
As in the civilian government, a crackdown is needed by the military on some "big fish" corrupt officers.
An immediate stop to unfair and/or humiliating treatment and criticism of military officers by Congress and other public officials, especially those before the Commission on Appointments.
Speedy and firm disciplinary action and/or prosecution against military officials involved in human rights violations a well as of civilian law enforcement personnel involved in victimizing military personnel.
The purchase or charter by Congress of its own transportation facilities and a prohibition on their use of military equipment and aircraft.
The expansion of the government's public information program which has considerably improved since December 1989, with more participation by local government officials.
The provision of sufficient resources and support to the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military.

II. Confidence-Building Measures and their Outcome

In her personal capacity, Aquino employed several measures to improve the confidence level of the soldiers.

In one of her pet programs, Bigay Puso (or Gift from the Heart), she brought together the wives of cabinet officials and the wives of military officers.
Aquino initiated joint programs between PMA cadets and their counterparts in civilian universities. She described the initial results as deplorable. In the end, however, she served as the principal sponsor in one of several weddings that resulted from these mixed gatherings.
In order to consistently build up a positive image for the AFP, she appointed the provincial commanders as second chairs of the local Peace and Order Councils which were previously led by provincial governors. This arrangement provided the institutional linkages for coordinating civil-military efforts in security and peace and order operations. Furthermore, this set-up enhanced the military's image as a protector rather than a tormentor of the people.
Moreover, she expanded the AFP's role in development. "We were changing the attitude that the country was theirs for the taking, to the attitude that they were an integral part of the country they were serving".³²

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Bantay-Bayan

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Some 4,579 military rebels, consisting of 487 officers, 3,424 enlisted men, 93 members of the Integrated National Police, 70 trainees, and 475 CAFGU Active Auxiliaries (CAAs,) have been captured or have surrendered.
Of those who participated in the coup attempts, 117 were serving prison sentences; 785 remained in detention pending results of court martial action; and 326 were less severely punished through dismissal from the service, forfeiture of pay, demotion, administrative confinement, loss of seniority, and/or reprimand.

III. Concluding Comments

In conclusion, two comments may be relevant in the Philippine approach to normalizing civil-military relations. One comment is with regard to the continuing involvement of the military in national development efforts. The experience during the Marcos years, when this role was expanded, indicated that the role of the military in national development could be a double-edged sword. One edge allows the military to remain busy and deprives it of idleness which can lead it to conspire against the government. The other edge allows them to build a political base, especially if the national development projects are of long duration in a single place. This act tends to facilitate the politicization of the military.

The other comment concerns the policy adopted by Ramos regarding amnesty extended to the military rebels. Unconditional amnesty was deemed necessary to encourage the rebels to desist from undertaking plots against the government because a stable and peaceful political environment was seen as a requirement for economic recovery and growth. However, letting the rebel military off the hook so easily after having committed a serious crime against the Constitution they have sworn to protect and defend and against the government that enjoys supremacy over them could teach young officers a bad lesson. Allowing the rebels to go unpunished will have serious consequences for military subordination to civilian political authority in the future.

Part Four: Institutional programs of the AFP on military reform, reconciliation, and nation-building

Profile 1: Redefining the Core Values of the AFP

" Do Good, Look Good, and Feel Good" AFP

Billboards trumpeting "Do Good, Look Good, and Feel Good" are strategically displayed in most AFP bases. The same slogan is also always printed in major AFP publications. It captures, in very simple terms, the collective and shared aspirations of the entire AFP. Since 1986, the AFP has been implementing a number of programs and activities that are directed towards increasing excellence and professionalism in the AFP. Professionalism, in this sense, covers familiarity with the AFP's basic doctrines and tactics, an understanding of the significance of the military's noble mission, and an exemplification of discipline embedded in military culture.

The different units of the AFP went through several processes in which the military's core values and functions were scrutinized and redefined. A concrete product of this assessment was the AFP Code of Ethics (AFPCOE). In the different workshops that were held to produce this document, it was agreed by the participants that the principle of solidarity be added to the AFP's core values of honor, loyalty, valor, and duty.

Maka-Diyos

Maka-Bayan

Maka-tao

Maka-kalikasan

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Figure 1: The Six Elements of National Security
As defined by Brig. Gen. Jose T. Almonte

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³⁹

The AFP Chaplain Service

Table 3: AFP Chaplain's Office Accomplishment Report 1992 to 1997

Activities	Total # of Occasions	Total # of Beneficiaries
Bible Study	30,688	266,348
Prayer Meeting/Rally	18,371	161,246
Catechism	3,628	67,693
Baptism/Confirmation	2,322	6,200
Mass Wedding	735	5,512
Procession	120	43,777
Fellowship (Sharing)	5,843	107,497
Lenten Season Activities	73	3,143
Retreat	20	543
Procession	52	2,600
Advent Activities	353	43,000
Dawn Masses	325	30,000
Christmas Eve Mass	14	6,500
New Year's Eve Mass	14	6,500
Holy Mass	16,184	332,334
Novena	2,323	50,238
Guidance Counseling	12,301	73,819
Other value formation activities (unspecified)	5,866	1154,213
Source: Civil-Military Office Accomplishment Report 1999, AFP

The Office of Ethical Standards and Public Accountability (OESPA)

⁴⁰

Mission

Functions

Organizational Structure

Organization

1. Command and Control

2. Personnel and Administrative Division

3. Professional and Graft Prevention Division

4. Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL) Division

5. Investigation and Intelligence Division

6. Legal Division

Functional Relationship with other AFP Offices

Organization	Functions
	Advise	Prosecution	Jurisdiction
Office of Ethical Standards and Public Accountability (OESPA)	Ethical Standards and Public Accountability	Prosecute	Violations of RA 3019 and 1379, pertinent provisions of RPC and major violations of AFP Policies
Office of the Inspector General (OTIG)	Unit Readiness and Unit Discipline	Prosecute	Violations of Policies and Breaches of Unit Discipline
Office of the Probo-Marshall General (OTPMG)	Order and Safety Inside Camp	Prosecute	Disturbance of Peace and Order, Crimes against person and property, vehicular accidents and breaches of individual soldiers discipline
Office of the Judge Advocate General (OTJAG)	Legal Matters	-o-	Prepares charges on complaints received from OESPA, OTIG and OTPMG

Understanding that accountability can only be nurtured through transparency, OESPA makes use of consultative seminars to encourage involvement and support for its programs among military personnel.

The Bible of Soldiery: The AFP Code of Ethics (AFPCOE)

One of OESPA's very first projects was the formulation of the AFP's Code of Ethics (AFCOE). On July 31, 1990, the OESPA sponsored a consultative workshop attended by the Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs of the General Staff of the Major Services and the Joint Staff. These officials proposed the organization of a cross-sectoral delegation to formulate the AFPCOE. This proposal was supported by the CSAFP (Chief of Staff, AFP) and the Deputy Chiefs of Staff (DCSs).

The project underwent three phases: (1) drafting, (2) validation, and (3) ratification.

Drafting the AFPCOE took 23 working days from October 11 to November 13, 1990. Representing a cross-section of the AFP, the delegates were composed of 1 MNSA (Masters in National Security Administration), 14 GSC (General Staff College) graduates, 4 military lawyers, 3 engineers, 3 chaplains, 1 medical doctor, 1 nurse, 1 WAC, 14 Master Sergeants, and the rest hailed from line and technical fields.⁴¹ The oldest delegate was 57 years old with 33 years of service in the police force and the youngest was 27 years old with 5 years of commissioned active military service. The average age of the participants was 42 while the average length of service was 17 years.

The validation phase was done on site where soldiers were consulted on their opinions regarding the newly drafted AFPCOE. In these consultations, OESPA personnel inhibited themselves from the seminars so as to encourage the soldiers to speak their minds openly.

The entire AFP ratified the AFPCOE in June 1991. Chief of Staff Gen. Lisandro C. Abadia officially declared the ratification of the Code on August 19, 1991. On September 30, 1991, every officer and enlisted personnel simultaneously took the Oath of Allegiance to the Code of Ethics during flag raising ceremonies all over the country.

The AFP, through the OESPA, incorporated into the AFP system several strategies to ensure the propagation, internalization, and institutionalization of the AFPCOE. The following strategies were incorporated:⁴²

OESPA's Strategy Against Graft and Corruption

As a result of a series of Strategic Planning Conferences with selected senior officers of the AFP, the OESPA was able to formulate a three-pronged strategy to address graft and corruption in the AFP. A thorough analysis of the common incidences of graft and corruption produced an understanding of its basic causes.

The participants in the series of workshops identified three main instances when military personnel become vulnerable to corrupt practices. These instances include attraction, opportunity, and rationalization. The combination of these three instances causes the desensitization of military personnel against immoral and illegal activities.

To combat illegal activities, OESPA focused on stopping the persistence of these practices through (1) integrity promotion, (2) graft and corruption prevention, and (3) prosecution.

Integrity Promotion centers on activities designed to develop the correct attitude and sound reasoning in soldiers so that they will stop rationalizing the commission of graft. To support these activities, the OESPA continually produces materials and undertakes activities aimed at the internalization of the AFP's five core values: honor, valor, duty, loyalty, and solidarity. The formulation of the AFPCOE is a concrete example.

Graft and Corruption Prevention, the second strategy employed by OESPA, is designed to remove the opportunities to commit graft. Several rules have been implemented to support this strategy such as the designation of OESPA representatives in different military units and offices as well as in boards that screen personnel who will occupy sensitive positions; elimination of the "entourage syndrome" where newly designated unit commanders bring along selected or highly favored officers to replace the incumbents; and the filing of a Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL) annually.⁴³

A program, entitled OESPA-AFP Ombudsman Education and Enlightenment Program, was also formulated by OESPA in coordination with the AFP Ombudsman Office. The program consists of a one-day lecture conducted in military units by trained lecturers from three operational units: Civil-Military Operations, Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs, and OESPA. The modules included in the lecture are: AFP Code of Ethics and Military Professionalism, Proper Preparation of the Statement of Assets and Liabilities, Moral and Spiritual Values, Integrity Circle, and Laws on Public Service. Integrity Circles are composed of three to five middle management officials. The so-called integrity circles are intended to lay down the necessary foundation for a moral recovery crusade aimed at the infusion of the Filipino core values into culture, systems, and processes of the organization.

The requirement to file a SAL was inspired by a law enacted by Congress to give substance to the constitutional provision that promotes accountability of public officials. Section 7 of Republic Act 3019 requires the filing of a detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and sources of the individual's income; the amounts of the individual's personal and family expenses; and the amount of income taxes paid for during the immediate past calendar year. The OESPA reviews this document before issuing appropriate clearance, especially for officers and enlisted personnel occupying or about to be transferred to sensitive positions.

The third strategy, prosecution, must be employed when the attempts at prevention are not successful. Towards this end, the OESPA assisted the AFP in the formulation of the Military Justice Handbook that contains a detailed outline of military offenses and their corresponding sanctions.

Table 4 contains the OESPA's accomplishment report from 1994 to 1998 in terms of the number of participants in its Enlightenment Programs.

Table 4: OESPA's Accomplishment Report 1994 to 1998

YEAR	Officers	Enlisted Personnel	CE	OC	Total
1994	791	2,433	0	0	3,224
1995	776	3,207	34	0	4,017
1996	342	1,427	124	116	2,009
1997	371	2,243	129	0	2,743
1998	363	1,852	32	0	2,247
Total	2,643	11,162	319	116	14,240

Profile 2: The AFP and its Agenda on Human Rights

Promotion and Adherence to Human Rights

In a report prepared by the Task Force Detainees of the Philippines (TFDP), a leading Philippine human rights NGO, it was observed that from 1977 to 1985, the Marcos regime repeatedly committed five types of human rights violations against individuals, namely savaging, torture, arrest, detention, and disappearance. Table 5 summarizes the violations from 1980 until the downfall of the Marcos regime in February 1986. According to the report, the figure for the massacres could be largely understated and the number of victims killed and wounded could not be correctly estimated.

Table 5: Comparative Statistics on Human Rights Violation by Type - January 1980 to February 1986

Year	Arrested Persons	Salvaged Persons	Disappeared Persons	Massacre/ Near Massacre Cases	Total
1980	962	218	19	3	1,202
1981	1,377	321	53	10	1,761
1982	1,911	210	42	13	2,176
1983	2,088	368	145	25	2,626
1984	4,168	538	158	25	4,889
1985	5,967	429	189	54	6,639
1986 (Jan-Feb)	478	74	28	27	607
Total	16,951	2,158	634	157	19,900
Source: Miranda, Felipe B. The Philippine Military at the Crossroads of Democratization, p.21

The Commission on Human Rights reports that the prime perpetrator of these violations was either the police or the military.44

More than a decade of these violent practices, coupled with graft and corruption, resulted in a severe erosion of the trust and credibility of these law enforcement officers among the people. In a 1991 National Survey conducted by the Social Weather Stations, respondents who claimed that human rights violations happen frequently in their area, point to the military and the police as the top two human rights violators as indicated in Table 6.

Table 6: Perceived Human Rights Violators - SWS November 1991 National Survey

Q: Who do you regard as responsible for such Violations? Who else? (open-ended)
[Base: respondents who say that human rights violations happen frequently/sometimes in their area)
Military	18 %
Police	16
People(nobody in particular)	11
Barangay Chairman/Captain	9
Government	7
Mayor	7
People who are drunk	3
New Peoples Army	3
Barangay Officials	2
Drug Addicts	2
Source: Social Weather Bulletin 95-19/20, p.5

At her inauguration as President, Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 which laid down her commitment to human rights. In this Proclamation, she pledged "to do justice to numerous victims of human rights violations. Consistent with the demands of the sovereign people, we pledge a government dedicated to uphold truth and justice, morality and decency in Government, freedom and democracy".

A few days afterwards, she issued Proclamation No. 2 which lifted the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus throughout the Philippines. Aquino also issued Executive Order No. 8 which created the Presidential Committee on Human Rights. The primary task of the Committee was to assist the President in the discharge of her duty to respect and uphold human rights.

Moreover, Aquino found it necessary to create a body under the Executive Department to assess and monitor the human rights situation in the country and to recommend proper plans of action to promote and protect human rights. This body was composed of representatives from the executive branch, Congress, the Commission on Human Rights, and non-government organizations such as the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) and the Philippine Alliance of Human Rights Advocate (PAHRA), with the Secretary of Justice as Chairman.⁴⁵

In spite of the government's expressed commitment to human rights, violations did not abate during the Aquino administration especially at the height of the implementation of the total war policy against the insurgents. (See Table 7.) The Aquino administration pledged to conclude the insurgency in six years, a feat the Marcos regime failed to accomplish in 12 years.

Table 7 : Comparative Statistics on Human Rights Violation by Type- March 1986 to December 1991

Year	Arrested Persons	Salvaged Persons	Disappeared Persons	Massacre/ Near Massacre Cases	Total
1986 Mar-Dec	1,234	123	62	74	1,493
1987	8,637	267	52	98	9,054
1988	3,082	88	142	74	3,386
1989	1765	30	77	18	1,890
1990	5,789	122	70	48	6,029
1991	1,360	89	45	33	1,527
Total	21,867	719	448	345	23,379
Source: Miranda, Felipe B. The Philippine Military at the Crossroads of Democratization, p.21

Aquino's total war policy had two objectives: complete annihilation of the CPP/NPA and eradication of the political infrastructure of the underground movement. This policy may have caused an increase of human rights violations because they usually occur during the military's search-and-destroy missions since these missions are specialized activities that do not require any build up of goodwill between the military forces and the community.

Originating from the Marcos era, it was, however, under the Aquino administration that "paramilitary" or "vigilante" groups under the command of the AFP appear to have increased in number.⁴⁶ Paramilitary groups are composed of armed civilians banded together for purposes of counter-insurgency. Fanatical groups as well as bandit groups took advantage of the absence of defined recruitment guidelines and easily gained access to firearms and ammunitions. The different groups supplemented these weapons with their own such as handguns, bolo, knives, spears, or sticks.

Of these paramilitary organizations, the most organized were the Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs). Established on July 5, 1987 with Executive Order No. 264, the recruits increased the manpower of the AFP by 50%.⁴⁷ In 1990, it was estimated that half of the casualties in military offensives were CAFGUs.⁴⁸ In addition to the CAFGUs, there are at least 600 vigilante groups with membership numbering from a few individuals to hundreds according to the Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace (EMJP). The most well known of these vigilante groups are the Alsa Masa, Tadtads, Ilagas and various Lost Commands.

The creation of the CAFGUs was a widely-debated issue, especially regarding their constitutionality. Some legislators and journalists claimed that the CAFGU was similar to the disbanded Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF), a Marcos-era militia. ⁴⁹ Nevertheless, the criticisms and the suspicions were quelled with the AFP's assurance that the CAFGU would be placed under strict military regulation and discipline.

Although, at the beginning, the idea of utilizing armed community-based civilian groups to eject the NPA from populated communities seemed to work, the strategy later backfired when the same groups became abusive of their power. These groups became infamous for brutality that included beheading, dismembering, or eating the internal organs of suspected insurgents. In 1985, the group Tadtad murdered Italian priest Tullio Favali, ate his brains, and drank from his skull. This single act undermined, in the public eye, whatever positive gains paramilitary groups may have achieved in the past. This negative image also infected the military due to its creation of the armed community-based civilian groups.

The Military and the Agenda of Human Rights

Due to heavy criticism and aggressive lobbying from local and international human rights organizations, as well as the media, the executive, the military, the police, and the CHR passed various directives to improve the government's record on human rights. Below is a list of these directives.

At the same time, human rights cases were expedited to show the government's sincerity in bringing the perpetrators to justice. Appropriate disciplinary actions were taken against erring personnel. In 1990, a total of 1,328 AFP personnel were separated from the service, 312 were demoted, 264 were punished under the Articles of War and 922 had the cases against them dropped or resolved.⁵⁰ In the same year, 102 police personnel were separated from the service while 28 had their cases dismissed or resolved.⁵¹

Human Rights as an Integral Part of Military Education and Training

Inasmuch as the military was second to the police as the foremost violator of human rights, the government issued Presidential Memorandum Order No. 20 which required military personnel, police, and other arresting officers, "especially those in charge of detention and convicted prisoners" to undertake the study of human rights "as an integral and indispensable part" of their education and training.

The implementation of the memorandum's directives was vested with severe sanctions when continuity in office became dependent on the successful completion of the courses offered under the program.⁵² The CHR, in coordination with other government agencies, was tasked to establish a system of examination for military personnel and the police. The National Police Commission was directed to include basic knowledge on human rights in the qualifying examinations for police work. At the same time, it was ordered by law to develop a performance evaluation system that would promote the improvement of individual efficiency and behavioral discipline while promoting organizational effectiveness and respect for the constitutional and human rights of the citizens, democratic principles and ideals, and the supremacy of civilian authority over the military.⁵³

In March 1989, the PCHR, in coordination with the Department of National Defense (DND) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), organized a "National Trainors' Training Program on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law for the Military". In subsequent meetings, these three groups served as the core of the Inter-Agency Steering Committee, their respective heads of agencies as the Inter-Agency Body, with the CHR serving as secretariat.⁵⁴

To ensure smooth coordination and adequate logistical support, the members of the inter-agency committee are all high-level officials from the CHR, the PNP, and the AFP. The inter-agency committee includes the following officials:

Meanwhile, the Chief for Plans and Programs in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Education and Training, Air Force Col. Manuel Carranza. Jr, introduced the integration of human rights courses within the AFP. He moved for the creation of an inter-agency HR logo and for the fashioning of HR-IHL Advocacy pins to be awarded to any graduate of a three-day HR training seminar. Graduates wear these pins as part of their uniform. This practice serves as a constant reminder to the soldiers that they must uphold human rights. Furthermore, he included the HR-IHL Trainors' Training in the AFP's yearly funded training program. In 1990, the responsibility for HR matters was transferred to the Deputy Staff for Civil-Military Operations. Consequently, Brig. Gen. Emiliano Templo created a Human Rights Desk to oversee human rights matters in the AFP.⁵⁵

The Inter-Agency Committee formulated and approved the following courses for the military:⁵⁶

Representatives of national and region-based human rights NGOs were tapped as resource persons in the training programs. This strategy helped bridge the gap between the NGOs and the police/military sector in the area of human rights implementation and observance. These resource persons hailed from the Philippine Alliance of Human Rights Advocates (PAHRA), Kapisanan ng mga Kamag-Anak at Kaibigan ng mga Bilanggong Pulitikal sa Pilipinas (KAPATID, an association of relatives and friends of political detainees in the Philippines), Task Force Detainees of the Philippines (TFDP), Association of Major Religious Superiors of the Philippines (AMRSP), Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace (EMJP), and National Secretariat for Social Action (NASSA).⁵⁷

The AFP Memorandum Providing for the Protection and Rehabilitation of Innocent Civilians affected by AFP counter-insurgency operations, dated 15 July 1988, laid down the operational procedures for the proper handling of post-military operations. This memorandum states that:

Coordination and liaison with national and local government agencies should be pursued in undertaking the following immediate tasks after the conduct of operations:

In order to protect troops from false charges of looting, abuse, and other forms of misbehavior, civil relations groups shall immediately conduct a survey of the residents after the operation and make proper documentation to include:

A documented report of the CMO aspect of the operation including the resident's testimonies shall be released for media publication to preempt adverse propaganda from other interested groups.

Consistent with the AFP's initiative to expand and strengthen its linkages with the government and NGOs, and to encourage transparency and fair reporting from the media, the AFP issued Guidelines on Human Rights and Improvement of Discipline in the AFP, dated January 1989. The AFP called for coordinated action with corresponding offices of the CHR, DOJ, and active NGOs in the area including sectoral elements such as religious organizations and human rights advocates in responding to human rights complaints.

The Military and the Philippine Human Rights Situation

In its decade report for 1988 to 1998, the Commission on Human Rights claimed a substantial decrease in the incidence of human rights violations in the country. In addition, from 1995 to 1998, CHR reported that the military had improved its human rights record and had been dislodged by the police (1st), local officials/employees (2nd), and civilians (3rd) as the alleged leading HR perpetrators.⁵⁸ (See Figure 2.)

A study commissioned by the Development Academy of the Philippines and the CHR verified the effectiveness and impact of the CHR's training program on the military and the police. ⁵⁹ The study reports that the CHR's human rights program has succeeded in instilling some degree of consciousness among the police and military respondents. The authors pronounced that:

"even those who have not gone through any formal training with the CHR have been made aware of society's concern for these rights through the media. But prior through their training, some respondents saw human rights as a political instrument of insurgents or as a creation of the media".

But on the whole, human rights education has succeeded in instilling some amount of consciousness and positive regard for human rights. This is particularly true among the military respondents who say they are now careful in observing human rights.

The military... seems to be more aware of the importance of human rights advocacy. According to one respondent, the military is presently reorienting itself to become more respectful of human rights since it realized how human rights violations work against the military's counterinsurgency campaign. However, they continue to distinguish between the rights of the guerilla combatants and war prisoners and innocent civilians. While the military respondents maintain that the success of the mission is still the soldier's top priority, most of them see no conflict between this and proper observance of human rights in the field."

Profile 3: Co-ed Military Education and Recruitment at the Philippine Military Academy

Republic Act 7192, enacted on February 12, 1992, seeks to promote the integration of women as full and equal partners of men in development and nation-building. Specifically, Section 7, which pertains to women's admission to military schools, states that:

Sec. 7: Any provision of the law contrary notwithstanding, consistent with the needs of the services, women shall be accorded equal opportunity for appointment, admission, training, graduation and commissioning in all military or similar schools of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police not later than the fourth academic year following the approval of this Act in accordance with the standards required for men except for those minimum essential adjustments required by physiological differences between sexes.

The enactment of this law facilitated the entry of female cadets to the Philippine Military Academy in 1993. Of the thousands who applied, 500 were women. Of these 500, 200 passed the written examinations but only 16 qualified. Two of the 16 female applicants did not show up, five dropped out over the next succeeding months of grueling training and only seven made it to graduation. Of the seven female cadets that graduated, three were included in the Top 10.

The admission of female cadets to the PMA raised some apprehensions. Many feared that the policy might lower the standards and quality of the corps of cadets. This fear coincides with the fact that 30% of the AFP's 12,000-strong officer corps is from the PMA. Moreover, a few alumnae expressed their concern about the incidence of sexual harassment or untimely pregnancies. "Considering the cold temperature and scenic environment at the PMA and the aggressiveness of Filipino men, pregnancy becomes an inevitable possibility that could certainly pose a serious problem for PMA authorities," warned Brig. Gen. Manuel Mariano, president of the influential PMA Alumni Association. 60 The academy, however, has strict rules prohibiting fraternization among cadets that could serve as deterrence to this concern. In addition, vulnerability to hazing was another concern raised by some groups.⁶¹

In reality, not only have these fears been unfounded but the three batches of female cadet graduates have exceeded the military's and public's expectations. Consistently, the female cadets have garnered places in the academy's honor roll. In the graduating class of 1998, a female cadet bested all of the other 215 cadets. Navy Midshipman Arlene De La Cruz, topped the PMA entrance exam and consistently led her batch throughout her years. In addition, De La Cruz received the Philippine Navy Saber for being the most senior cadet to join the Navy, as well as the Humanities Plaque for excelling in her humanities subjects.⁶² The first and second batch of female cadet graduates garnered three positions each in the honor roll. The table below summarizes the female cadets' performance.

Table 8: Summary of Female Cadets' Performance - 1993 to 1998

Year	Total No. of Cadets	Total No. of Female Cadets Accepted	Position Garnered in Honor Roll	Rank in Honor Roll
1993	123	16	3	3^rd, 7^th, 10^th
1994	162	11	3	4^th, 5^th, 10^th
1995	216	13	2	1^st,5^th
1996	400	20	currently enrolled
1997	350	18	currently enrolled
1998	326	21	currently enrolled
Source: Public Information Office, PMA

There have been no reports of male cadets raising issues of double standard in light of the female cadets' achievements. These accomplishments do not only speak well of the female cadets' abilities but also of the ability of the PMA, an all-male institution for 92 years, to adjust to the changing environment.

According to Commodore Domingo Salipsip, AFP Chief for Personnel, the different AFP frontline units, such as the Scout Rangers or the Marines, have been asked to identify the criteria for the entry of female officers in the field. "We will allow women to compete and find their places in the different line specialties," he said.⁶³

The important issue that confronts the military is whether female officers should be allowed to perform combat duty. In the past, the AFP recruited female soldiers for the Women's Auxiliary Corps whose members were confined to communications and deskwork. Different arguments have been presented for or against this issue. Victoria Blancaflor of Class 1997 said she believed the Army would provide good opportunities for women. "If we won't be given those combat assignments then we won't be promoted as aggressively as our male counterparts. We want to be given the chance to become generals."⁶⁴

Senator Rodolfo Biazon, a former AFP chief of staff, expressed his reservations about the issue. "I don't foresee the women performing combat jobs such as infantry work, or in the armor and artillery branch of the Philippine Army."⁶⁵ He used the biological nature and differences between the sexes as the rationale for his views, although he said things might be different in the Navy or in the Air Force, where women can serve as pilots and or other combat duties that require not just physical strength.

Senator Orlando Mercado, current Secretary of the Department of National Defense, believes that: "The issue of biological limitation is a figment of the imagination of some men who think they are much stronger than women. More than muscles, a lot of brain goes into fighting".⁶⁶ He adds that some women might turn out to be more brilliant infantry generals and that he would like to see a woman from the infantry rising to become the AFP's chief of staff. Senator Mercado recommended that instead of a law specifying women's role in the military, commanders should be allowed to decide, case by case, if assigning a woman to combat duty would be detrimental to a mission or would endanger other soldiers in the process.

Gen. Arnulfo Acedera, Jr, former AFP Chief of Staff remarked, "It would be better if we initially assign them to combat support units so that they would gain experience and further knowledge about combat situations," he states.⁶⁷ Acedera believes that the question of whether the female officers would be allowed to do combat duty is a policy issue that may require action above the military.⁶⁸

"Life at the PMA is full of challenges and opportunities. I wanted to become a pilot, which is the main reason why I joined the PMA. I was not out to prove something like I can be at par with the men who had made it here. It was just in pursuit of a dream and a desire to fly the skies," states Amorelle Mackay of Class 2001.⁶⁹

Lt. Gen. Clemente Mariano, former Army Chief and AFP Vice Chief of Staff, states: "The men will have to prove themselves more, creating a higher level of competitiveness and subsequently improving the quality of our soldiers. Opportunities will greatly depend on their (women's) capabilities."⁷⁰ Thus far, the AFP has only produced two female generals, both from the nursing corps.

"We hope that there will be more women generals in the AFP in the near future",⁷¹ said Lt. Gen. Mariano in a statement that serves as a fitting welcome for the three batches of female graduates, who just like their male counterparts, would have to find their own places within the AFP hierarchy.

The admission of female cadets at the PMA is certain to have an impact on traditional military views regarding women, and pave the way towards a more egalitarian and democratic military in the Philippines. As more and more women enter the Philippine Military Academy and successfully perform the rigorous four years of required training, the AFP is bound to re-examine the roles these female officers will perform within the military hierarchy. During the height of the Mindanao hostage saga, one of the pilots that bombed the strongholds of the Abu Sayyaf extremists was a Philippine Air Force (PAF) female pilot. This action can be taken as a positive sign that the AFP is open to assigning women other roles in the military beyond the confines of clerical jobs and medical missions. As of now, this program is in its early and experimental stages and its impact is yet to be fully demonstrated.

Profile 4: Civil-Military Operations - Special Focus on Unlad-Bayan

The mandate assigned to the AFP by the Philippine Constitution "to protect the people" comes in two dimensions: security and development. Evidently, one dimension will be meaningless without the other; development without security cannot be complete as espoused by the consecutive Commander-in Chiefs, Aquino and Ramos. The AFP has always believed that stability can only be attained through genuine socio-political and economic development.

Due to a combination of external and internal events, the AFP was afforded the opportunity to actively participate in the development programs of the government. The external events included the cessation of the Cold War and the global collapse of communism, and the internal factors included an improved internal security situation, the conduct of peace negotiations with armed rebel groups, and the transfer of the primary responsibility of preserving internal security to the Philippine National Police from the AFP.

Globally, more and more countries are actively debating the wisdom of utilizing the military for national development programs. In the context of less- developed countries such as the Philippines, however, the concept of security and development are so closely connected and inter-related that it is sometimes difficult to delineate which activities are strictly security-related and which are not. Moreover, due to limited resources, the military is a ready source for well-trained and organized professionals who have expertise in specific fields that are crucial for development. Military officers come from varied backgrounds such as engineering, medicine, agriculture and the academe. This specific expertise coupled with financial resources and the ability to be readily mobilized and dispatched to any area, makes the military a very potent force for development. With careful consideration, the military will remain loyal to its mandate and be a positive partner for development as long as it is not made to regularly or intensively interact with the civilian population. At the same time, the government must continue to strengthen its other institutions and promote better allocation of its resources so that there will be no need to utilize the military for non-defense matters.

As a result of the military's abuse during the martial law years, and as a response to the military's adventurism in the political sphere with the series of coup d'etats during Aquino's term, oversight functions over the military have been put in place. These oversight functions include:

PDGS - Documents